Pakistan deepening Schisms

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EPW Commentary December 9, 2000
Pakistan:Deepening Schisms S Akbar Zaidi
If we were to compare Pakistan three decades ago to what it is today, the extent and nature of the differences would be of startling proportions. Despite pleas by some to ‘forgive and forget’, Pakistan today constitutes less than half the country it was just three decades ago.Change is perhaps the most ordinary, though consistent, process that we observe. Yet there is little understanding, leave alone agreement, of what has changed and on the nature and direction of that change. There are reasons for this, perhaps rooted in an academic and intellectual tradition which no longer encourages scholarship, enquiry or dissent. Perhaps the nature of change in society has resulted in academic and scholarly values and a culture which is far more suited to the requirements of donors and consultants than to the pursuit of knowledge. This itself is a manifestation as well as a consequence of that change. In fact, if we read the few published writings of Akhtar Hameed Khan, or recall our individual meetings with him, what is likely to strike us most is that we realise that he belonged to the ‘old school’, and was an individual acutely aware of how change was taking place, understanding and recognising the nature of that change, and in fact, even pre-empting it. It is unlikely that any consensus about the nature of economic and social change in Pakistan can be arrived at. An attempt is made here only to point out a few important transitions and transformations that have taken place in Pakistan over the last three decades or so.If we examine the work and writings of Akhtar Hameed Khan or of Arif Hasan, numerous key arguments which indicate change can be ascertained. I will build on their considerable empirical work and argue that Pakistan is principally urban, with a deepening and integrating cash economy, and is clearly non-feudal in its economic, social and political manifestation. Let me begin with this last assertion/hypothesis/fact first.Urban not Feudal Irrespective of our intrepretation of Pakistan’s social and economic relations of production and exchange, cannot be termed feudal. Pakistan may have been what is called ‘feudal’ a century ago, or it may have had relations of production and of exchange resembling some varient of feudalism, but today it has neither. There is probably more confusion and disagreement on this aspect of Pakistani society, than perhaps any other. In the Pakistani context, and particularly in the media, the term ‘feudalism’ is used for every sort of injustice, misdemeanour, excess, misuse of power, and act of exploitation that takes place in the country. However, the real meaning of the term feudalism is far more specified and restrictive. It is worth emphasising that feudalism is a concept which explains and identifies how owners of land in agriculture relate to people who work on that land. Feudalism is a term which applies purely to agriculture, and that too an agriculture of a very specific nature. One cannot have feudal industrialists or bureaucrats. Moreover, theoretically the term feudalism has rather strict conditions which need to be fulfilled for one to claim that agriculture is ‘feudal’. Agricultural labour needs to be unfree, in the sense that it is not separated from the means of production (land); extra-economic coercion must exist; a fusion of economic and political power at the point of production must take place within a localised structure of power; the economic unit should be of a subsistence of self-sufficient nature, producing and consuming most of its needs; and simple reproduction would take place, where most of the surplus is consumed locally and not exchanged. Based on this criteria, Pakistan is certainly not, and may never have been ‘feudal’. One is not arguing here that there is no exploitation in agriculture in Pakistan. Far from it not only does exploitation exist, it is far more ruthless, encompassing and global, than ever before. However, because labour in Pakistan is largely free from the shackles of the landlord, because production is for the national and global markets, because a cash economy which is highly integrated with the world of capital dominates, and because localised power has shifted to more distant individuals and loci, one cannot call the nature of relations feudal. It is time to dispense with this label all together and perhaps look at the actual and existing nature of relations. Reza Ali’s painstaking work of examining the census results since 1861, and more topically since 1972 prove that Pakistan is now decidedly urban. Pakistan’s urban population constitutes today approximately 40 to 60 per cent of the total population. Pakistan’s economy, culture, lifestyle and values, are urban phenomena that are being copied and emulated in areas which some refer to as rural. In fact, one could argue that the urban/rural divide, strictly, does not exist, and it should be of little consequence to most social scientists, although electoral boundaries, and public officials may still prefer to hold on to a hard and fast divide. With transportation and communication now extensive, the isolation of villages and smaller towns has been broken, and we are in many ways seeing the growth of regional, domestic and international linkages being made even in remote regions. There is far greater regional and domestic integration of markets and labour than ever before. The mobility of goods and labour has gone hand in hand with that of the growth and expansion of the cash economy. Relations of exchange and of production are now largely on a cash basis, whether in the form of up-front money or credit. The ability of those with capital to lend is no longer determined by their limited geographical location, and money amassed either through legal or illegal means, finds the most profitable channel wherever it finds a niche. Money lenders in the form of middlemen or transporters, have replaced the wadera and chaudhris, creating a new moneyed class. Increasingly money, rather than ‘zaat’ or ‘biradari’ connections, determine access to jobs, licences and other opportunities. Cash has become the great equaliser, perhaps even affecting traditional cultural ties and bonds.Globalisation A key force which is of more recent vintage, but perhaps more powerful than any other we may have known (with the exception of colonialism) is the new form of subjugation of nations to the western economy and its institutions, namely, that of globalisation. With international debt accumulated to around $35 billion, and with the IMF and World Bank watching and ordering the country’s each and every economic and political move, the term ‘independence’ seems to have lost much significance in modern Pakistan. Adherence to structural adjustment packages simply to keep the economy afloat, has meant that economic policy is dictateded by outsiders rather than by the country’s own leaders. Whether it is privatisation, the exchange rate of the rupee, power and utility tariffs, or the subsidy on wheat, everything is decided by advisors and international bureaucrats who refuse to acknowledge the impact of these deleterious policies. Households and farms now produce, not for the local or national markets, but increasingly, for a sophisticated quality-conscious global market. Standards have to be approved, and orders placed from abroad, before numerous industries and units begin their operation. While it has the potential to provide new avenues of employment, the global market also decides when we are to close down our shops. Moreover, lowering trade barriers in order to get prices right may have benefited the few who still have some purchasing power left in their pockets, but it has hurt local industry which is no longer able to compete against cheap and sophisticated imports. The dual-edged sword of globalisation seems to be working only in one direction in countries such as Pakistan.We can also mention numerous other aspects of globalisation as well. The large growth in NGOs, celebrated by many development workers as an ‘alternative paradigm’, cannot be separated from growing donor dependence. Barring few notable exceptions, most large and well known NGOs survive on donor funding, often devising their programmes and projects in line with the priorities of donors rather than those of the community. Not just NGOs, but researchers and consultants too, are productive primarily when their projects are funded, not on their own initiatives. Money, or a relationship based primarily on cash, determines the output of intellectuals, academics, voluntary workers, and government officials.A strange irony is that three decades ago, or in fact even two decades ago, Pakistan was ruled by a military government and in certain senses, nothing seems to have changed. Each military government usurped power to save the nation/country from itself and has made claims that it has done so to establish a new, cleaner, democratic order. Has the state changed at all over these three decades except for two brief interregna 1971-77 and 1988-99?Whatever opinion one has of the present military regime, most analysts would agree that it differs from its predecessors. It may still be early days to define the form and broad ideology of the present regime, but given a vastly changed domestic, regional and international order, it has had to respond to some of the requirements of modern Pakistan. Its confused devolution plan is an indication that it is trying to do so. Another difference between the state of two or even three decades ago is that it is a far weaker state, which is groping to find a place for itself in today’s Pakistan. Its inability to collect taxes or to enforce an effective rule of law and order are just two signs of its weakness compared to the not-so-distant past. It has also had to become somewhat more accommodative of the different new classes and social interests that have emerged. The nature of the state has changed markedly in the last three decades, but clearly by not enough.Deeper Schisms It is difficult to clearly articulate what all these changes mean or predict where they are taking us. There are obvious trends which suggest that Pakistan has made remarkable advancements in its social structures, making them perhaps more democratic with far greater participation by the so-called ‘masses’ in literacy, for example, or as manifested in the large growth of home ownership of the Pakistani population. Perhaps one can unambiguously call this progress. Yet, there are equally significant signs which suggest that Pakistan is in retrograde motion, that sectarian and religious intolerance and divides now determine the civil code in Pakistan. The term ‘progress’ for many, would sound hollow in a context without an examination of ideological, religious and belief systems. Even if the social structure has become more modern, a more militant fundamentalism of the state and of society will question this modernity. On the other hand, some would perhaps argue that this tilt towards fundamentalism is just a reflection of the dichotomous nature of societal developments. Indeed, there is need for far greater clarity, discourse and scholarship on these issues.Having made a number of assertions or stated hypotheses or facts, I will end with one last scenario which I think is very possible. I believe that in the next decade the trends and processes identified here will intensify further, perhaps creating far greater schisms in our disharmonious and dichotomous path of development. In an urban Pakistan, with a large middle class dominating local level institutions, politics and the local economy, the direction of change in Pakistan is going to come through this section of society. Already, most cities have large ‘katchi abadis’ and low-income settlements, where collective action and organisations have emerged in every neighbourhood. These entities have, in many cases, through their own efforts successfully addressed and solved many of their infrastructure and civic issues. It is very probable, that once it consolidates itself, this urban class is going to determine the future economic and political course of this country. Which direction it takes and the nature of politics it pursues, is still uncertain, but most probably, it will come into increasing conflict and contradiction with the structures of the state and of globalisation