The first India Pakistan War-1948

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EPW Book Review July 06, 2002
The First War with Pakistan
War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48 by C Dasgupta; Sage Publications, Delhi, 2002; pp 239, Rs 250.
Sanjoy Bagchi
There is a paucity of scholarly studies of recent events in the post-independent history of India. There are journalistic attempts brought out to satisfy the public’s thirst for information about the happenings but these are rarely produced with careful analysis of all the relevant background material. There are of course contemporary accounts of the events in memoirs of the leading participants that are too subjective and personal. One of the reasons for this shortage could be the pervasive secrecy shrouding the relevant documentation and reference material, particularly in the archives of the government in spite of the lapse of several decades. Another might be the hesitation on the part of the scholars to engage in the laborious discipline of academic research. Since the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty has been at the helm of affairs of the country for most of the decades since independence, there might also be some reluctance in undertaking research that would expose the feet of clay of the demi-gods. Even an eminent historian like the late S Gopal was merely content with hagiography in his authoritative life history of Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan’s first invasion of Kashmir in the autumn of 1947, just a couple of months after India became independent, has received scant attention so far. There is Lt General L P Sen’s account of the military campaign and Prem Shankar Jha’s riposte to the partisan diatribe of Alastair Lamb on Kashmir’s accession to India. Apart from these, there are brief references to Kashmir’s invasion and accession in V P Menon’s story of the integration of the Indian states, Hodson’s history of the Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Karan Singh’s autobiography of his regency and Sheikh Abdullah’s rambling memoirs of his political career. Now Chandrasekhar Dasgupta has produced a scholarly account in his War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48. The author has relied on published and unpublished documentation of different sources in his study. He has extensively used official communications exchanged between London and New Delhi prior to, and immediately after, Indian independence, published by the British government in a series of volumes entitled The Transfer of Power in India, as well as the personal archives of Lord Mountbatten, the last viceroy. He has also referred to the published letters of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. The most valuable feature is the revelations from the archives of India office and Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in London showing the internal machinations of the British government in the handling of the Kashmir issue in the subcontinent and in the UN. A notable omission, however, is the absence of any reference to the government of India records. Perhaps the author was denied permission for their use. The contours of the episode are well demarcated. The maharaja of Kashmir did not decide on accession to either India or Pakistan because he was toying with the idea of remaining independent. Pakistan took advantage of this uncertainty to organise a massive incursion of so-called tribals in October 1947, aided and abetted by the Pakistan army. This pillaging rabble, resembling the hordes of Islamic marauders that used to raid India during medieval times, caused widespread destruction of life and property with bestial fury. When it reached the outskirts of Srinagar, the maharaja hurriedly acceded to India and asked for urgent military help. India responded by airlifting the quickly collected remnants of a brigade. The Indian army was spread all over the country and its nearby formations were actively engaged in protecting the gigantic two-way transfer of population following the partition of the country on religious lines. Several other regiments were in the process of being divided between the two newly created nations. In spite of these impediments, a formidable complement of armed forces was soon assembled and transported to Kashmir in an assortment of private and air force planes. This was an achievement entirely of Indian officers with hardly any contribution from the senior British officers who were rarely cooperative when not altogether hostile. Even Lord Mountbatten, who had been the chief of combined operations in the second world war, was astonished at the magnitude of the airlift undertaken at such short notice and paid handsome tributes to the Indian army and air force. Although there was no direct road communication with Srinagar and the weather had become increasingly inclement, the Indian army began the task of expelling the invaders. It succeeded in rolling them back right up to Uri when Pakistan got scared and wanted to intervene openly with its army. Looking at Pakistan’s plight, the British officers declared that maintaining the offensive beyond Uri would be possible only during the spring of 1948. Meanwhile, Nehru with his penchant for peace and international mediation was persuaded to approach the UN, even though his army was poised to clear the whole territory. At New York, with an outright hostile Britain taking the lead and the Americans being content to be its camp follower, together with our inept diplomacy, the issue got bogged down in power politics and the original cause of action was ignored. Instead of withdrawing the complaint from the UN and renewing the military option in pursuance of its legal rights, India persevered with its faith in an international solution. Since then, in spite of the efforts of the Security Council and its Kashmir Commission, the matter has proved intractable mainly because of the intransigence of Pakistan and its supporters Britain and the United States. Kashmir has continued to be a festering wound, draining away untold resources, with hardly any prospect of solution, particularly at this time when it has become an arena for militant Islam. Early Days of the ‘Kashmir Question’ Dasgupta’s book contains some aspects that deserve to be highlighted. The government of India handled the Kashmir question in different bodies from time to time and it impeded the emergence of a consistent and comprehensive picture. Mountbatten and Nehru were the only two who knew the whole story and the others were out of the loop. The cabinet never had the opportunity to decide Kashmir’s accession or consider the subsequent developments. The ministry of states, responsible for dealing with the princely states, was involved only at the very beginning when it sent V P Menon to collect the Instrument of Accession from the maharaja. Thereafter the defence committee of the cabinet dealt with all the subsequent developments and it was presided over by the viceroy, the constitutional head, and not by the prime minister. This anomalous position was Nehru’s creation and it made the British privy to all the internal thinking and secrets of the government. The ministry of states was also by-passed when Nehru created a separate department of Kashmir in his charge and obtained a civilian from his home province as its head. The ministry of external affairs was brought in much later in the day when the matter had already become embroiled in the UN. Another peculiar feature was that, besides Mountbatten, British officers occupied the top echelons of the defence forces on both sides. Auchinleck was the supreme commander of the sub-continent and the chiefs of the army, navy and air force in India and Pakistan were all British. In addition, the governors of the Punjab and Frontier Provinces in Pakistan were also British ICS officers. Although technically they were servants of the governments, they were serving but their loyalties were unambiguously with Britain. Bypassing their political superiors, they communicated among themselves and with the British High Commissioners in the two capitals, who were conduits for passing on information to Whitehall in London. Mountbatten continued to correspond regularly with King George VI, even after he became a titular governor-general and his understanding of the prevailing situation were always available to the British government. This cabal, acting in concert, often frustrated the directions of the Indian government. There was the infamous incident of an advance warning of the tribal invasion received from the governor of the Frontier Province by the army chief in Delhi, which was suppressed and hidden from the Indian government. Yet another aspect was the blatantly partisan attitude of Whitehall, which had completely identified itself with Pakistan. Dasgupta believes that Britain, in view of the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine, did not wish to alienate the Muslim Middle East further by recognising the legal merits of the Indian case or by maintaining a neutral stance. This is a charitable interpretation. Actually a number of British officers of the ICS and political service, having left India, joined the foreign office and the CRO and a disproportionate number among them belonged to the Punjab cadre.1 These people held the Indians responsible for depriving them of their comfortable living in India. Britain wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. Kashmir’s provisional accession was considered “a provocative mistake”, upsetting all the British calculations and releasing the latent animosity of the British civil service towards India. This was not the only occasion. Even during the 1965 war, Harold Wilson, the British prime minister admitted later that he had been misled by the CRO in his approach towards India. Dasgupta’s book, however, contains no clue about the role of the Indian High Commissioner in London in rectifying CRO’s mischief with the important ministers of the Labour government. Nehru had appointed the Mephistophelian Krishna Menon whose sole claim to the job rested, apart from being his sycophant, on his close relations with Labour Party’s top members. Did he for example meet Atlee, Bevin or Stafford Cripps to counter the CRO’s intrigues? Or was he completely unaware of what Noel-Baker was up to? Three questions have been intriguing ever since the Kashmir issue erupted. How did the element of plebiscite creep into Kashmir’s accession to India? Who was responsible for referring the matter to the UN? Why was the ceasefire ordered when the army was poised to advance up to the frontier? The question of plebiscite should be viewed in the context of what had happened in Junagarh and the ongoing dispute with Hyderabad. Muslim rulers headed the two states with predominantly Hindu population. Junagarh had formally acceded to Pakistan but its people rose in revolt, leading to the hasty flight of the Nawab from the state with his jewels and dogs. This seems to have been in the mind of Mountbatten when he went to Kashmir on holiday in June 1947. He was probably also aware that CRO wished Kashmir to join Pakistan. He advised the maharaja to refrain from talking about Kashmir’s independent status and to send representatives eventually to one of the constituent assemblies. He also suggested, “as far as possible they should consult the will of the people and do what the majority thought best for the state”.2 Patel had urged the maharaja in July to accede to India but Nehru had rejected the maharaja’s offer of accession in September before the invasion. Probably he was more interested at that time in the release of his friend Abdullah than the state’s accession. Jha suspects that possibly Abdullah might have also preferred an independent status for Kashmir for his own personal and political reasons.31 Abdullah himself was equivocal. He declared after his release, “the question of accession will be decided in the best interests of the people. Our first priority is to get rid of the Dogra domination. Then if the people decide to accede to Pakistan, I will be the first one to sign my name.”4 Thus the principle of people’s will had already been planted and Nehru with his preference for democratic processes lapped it up. When the invasion occurred and the maharaja asked for help, it was correctly pointed out that the Indian army cannot march into another independent country. Mountbatten suggested, “As a possible solution that Kashmir might temporarily accede to India, which would come to its aid, subject to the proviso that the will of the people should be ascertained as soon as law and order was generally restored”. Nehru accepted the principle and agreed with the viceroy that the determination of the people’s will have to wait for more propitious times.5 V P Menon also corroborates it and Mountbatten’s letter to maharaja Hari Singh confirms it.6 The instrument of accession, however, was not provisional; it was final and the condition attached in the letter of acceptance, although not detracting from its finality, was really unnecessary. There was convergence in the views on plebiscite between Abdullah and Mountbatten, each with different ends in mind, and Nehru went along merrily without realising its consequences. Karan Singh has hinted, “No doubt, Sardar Patel would have handled the situation differently, as, in fact, he did in Hyderabad and Junagarh”.7 Stiff Resistance Meeting stiff resistance from the Indian army, Jinnah ordered his own army to move into Kashmir in November 1947. Then Supreme Commander, Auchinleck, intervened and refused to obey his instructions. He also threatened that if the Pakistan army moved into Kashmir, every single British officer working in it, irrespective of his rank, would be withdrawn. Jinnah caved in and instead invited Nehru and Patel to Lahore for talks. Patel refused to go to Lahore in the face of the aggression while Nehru was agreeable. But Nehru being ill, he asked Mountbatten to go. It was at this meeting the idea of bringing in the UN was first mooted. Jinnah wanted the forces of both sides to be withdrawn and a plebiscite held under the joint control of the two countries, which was not acceptable to India. The Indian position was that once the raiders have been turned out, the Kashmir government would ascertain the will of the people. Mountbatten then floated the idea of a plebiscite under the auspices of the UN. That is how it began with the UN merely supervising the plebiscite to ensure that it was fair and impartial. Nehru accepted the innocuous idea of the UN supervision and he repeated it in a broadcast as well as in a statement in the parliament in November 1947. When the two prime ministers met a month later, they could not agree on the withdrawal of their forces. Nehru could not leave Kashmir at the mercy of the raiders and Liaqat Ali feared that he might have to go to war with the raiders to stop them. Nehru unwisely decided on two parallel courses – reference to the UN and at the same time, preparations to attack the supply lines in Pakistan.8 For the first time the Indian cabinet considered the Kashmir issue on December 20, 1947 and decided to approach the UN asking it to call upon Pakistan to desist from aggression. It is not clear how and why the scope of the reference to the UN was enlarged from mere supervision of the plebiscite to intervention in the fighting. Nehru thus surrendered the initiative and allowed the UN to tie his hands. Dasgupta claims that Mountbatten had pressed for the reference to the UN and the defence committee had decided on the two parallel approaches. Nehru’s letter to Mountbatten, however, shows that the idea was his. Moreover, Nehru was the prime minister and Mountbatten a constitutional governor general who could always be overruled with impunity. After all the cabinet of those days “treated Kashmir as the personal affair of Nehru” who “was unwilling to listen to anyone in international affairs”.9 Jha has also raised the same three questions but his exposition is far less convincing in regard to the third. He believes that Nehru’s willingness to accept a ceasefire while a third of Kashmir was still in Pakistan’s hands was born out of ‘far sighted calculation’. By the end of June 1948, Mountbatten had left India and was no longer in a position to exercise the hypnotic pressure as chairman of the cabinet’s defence committee. Nehru had become disillusioned with the UN and its power politics, which had deliberately and repeatedly ignored the country’s legal rights and ethical merits in the dispute. His efforts for more vigorous military actions were invariably thwarted by the British commanders. His thinking, according to Dasgupta, had increasingly turned towards a ceasefire since the end of October 1948. Bucher, the British chief of the Indian army knew that he was shortly going to be succeeded as commander-in-chief by Cariappa who was known to be more aggressive. Therefore, “Bucher approached Nehru for an immediate ceasefire” which would meet India’s minimum political terms. Jha’s perception is slightly different. Nehru and Abdullah were satisfied with the existing ground realities because the latter had no political influence in the Pakistan occupied territory. The Kashmir valley having been cleared of the raiders and road to Gilgit in control, a referendum would be in India’s favour guaranteeing a homogeneous area for the political domain of Abdullah. Jha concludes that “if Pakistan did not vacate ‘Azad Kashmir’, this would be a blessing in disguise” because that area “would not have become reconciled to becoming a part of India”10 in any case. This is ascribing a rather Machiavellian thought to Nehru but politicians can be devious. In any case, one thing is certain. The Indian army in Kashmir was confident of clearing “Kashmir altogether of the raiders” and had “every chance of success, [if] it been permitted to advance beyond Uri.”11 Dasgupta has produced a fascinating account of the first episode that had tested the competence of the new country’s leadership; the intrigues of the colonial power exercised through its senior officers located at key positions in the two countries, the crookedness of Whitehall and the cupidity of our leaders. It is a sad story. As an epitaph, Karan Singh summed it up admirably, “When a nation has the fortune of a genuine visionary as its leader, it sometimes has to pay the price of idealism itself”.12 Notes 1 Prem Shankar Jha: Kashmir 1947, OUP, Delhi, pp 93-113. 2 H V Hodson: The Great Divide, OUP, Karachi, p 442. 3 Jha, op cit, pp 42, 124 and 129. 4 Sheikh Abdullah: Flames of the Chinar, Penguin, Delhi, p 86. 5 Hodson, op cit, p 449. 6 V P Menon: The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, Orient Longmans, Delhi, p 381. 7 Karan Singh: Heir Apparent, OUP, Delhi, p 81. 8 Hodson, op cit, pp 459-69. 9 N V Gadgil: Government from Inside, Meenakshi, Meerut, pp 68 and 84. 10 Jha, op cit, p 126. 11 Lt Gen L P Sen: Slender Was the Thread, Orient Longmans, Delhi, p 294. 12 Karan Singh, op cit, p 81.